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abstract
Starting in the mid 1970s, Chile implemented comprehensive structural market 
reforms. Using manufacturing plant-level data on Chilean firms for years 1980 
to 2001, we estimate the role of reforms on efficiency. We analyze aggregate 
productivity constructed from micro data to find that in the aftermath of the 
reforms, efficiency gains were explained by within-plant improvements and 
by the net entry of new units. We also find that plants producing traded goods 
and plants facing liquidity constraints experienced the largest efficiency gains. 
Trade openness and a superior access to external finance seem to have partially 
accounted for the improvement in manufacturing performance.
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resumen
A partir de mediados de la década de los 70, Chile implementó un número re-
levante de reformas estructurales a sus mercados. En este trabajo estimamos el 
efecto de estas reformas sobre la eficiencia agregada, utilizando datos de plantas 
manufactureras chilenas para el período entre 1980 y 2001. Descomponemos 
la productividad agregada construida a partir de datos microeconómicos, en-
contrando que, luego de las reformas, las ganancias de eficiencia se explican 
tanto por mejoras al interior de las empresas como por la entrada neta de 
nuevos establecimientos. También encontramos que las mayores ganancias 
fueron obtenidas por las plantas que producen bienes transables y por aquellas 
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restringidas en su liquidez. Así, nuestros resultados sugieren que la apertura 
comercial y el mejor acceso al financiamiento externo explican en parte el mejor 
desempeño manufacturero en Chile.
Palabras clave: Dinámica de plantas, Productividad, Manufacturas, Chile.
JEL Classification: L16, L60, O47, O12.
1. introduction
Starting in the mid 1970s, Chile implemented deep and comprehensive 
structural reforms. The main goal was to increase the role of markets in the 
economy. The results speak for themselves. Chile’s outstanding macroeconomic 
performance during the past two decades has been portrayed as an example of 
successful market-oriented policies. Although these decades have not been free 
of turbulence, Chile has developed into a stable emerging economy that has 
outperformed the rest of Latin America. And though favorable external condi-
tions contributed to achieve this rapid growth, its main source was a remarkable 
increase in total factor productivity (TFP). In fact, since 1980, almost 90% of 
total growth is explained by efficiency gains.1
The response of the economy to reforms at the macroeconomic level reflects 
substantial changes in the industrial organization of domestic markets, as well as 
in the process of adaptation of individual firms to a more dynamic environment. 
Plant dynamics, as this paper shows, accounts for a substantial part of aggregate 
efficiency gains in Chile. Thus to better understand the link between market 
reforms and growth, we must first understand the link between these reforms 
and plant dynamics. Surprisingly, in spite of the broad agreement there is on 
the importance of market reforms in explaining high and sustained growth in 
Chile, limited empirical evidence has been provided to quantify this connection. 
Using plant-level data on Chilean manufacturing firms for the years 1980 to 2001 
period, we provide suggestive evidence. To do so, we characterize plant-level 
TFP to study the microeconomic sources of aggregate efficiency.
The Chilean experience is particularly interesting for several reasons: First, 
the reforms were deep and affected all key markets. Among other reforms, 
public firms were privatized, most trade impediments were lifted, labor markets 
were flexibilized, the financial system was liberalized, and individual accounts 
for social security were created. Second, the available micro data encompass 
a long period of time, including part of the enactment and implementation of 
the reforms and over a decade of their aftermath. This allows us to capture the 
full effects of the reforms. Finally, although most reforms were implemented 
at once, the deep recession of 1982 and 1983 led authorities to reverse some 
policies. Other papers analyzing the Chilean experience have used data between 
1 See Bergoeing et al. (2002a). Kehoe and Prescott (2002) provide similar findings 
for a sample of developed economies. Cole et al. (2005) show that most differences 
between the performance of Latin American countries and the Western economies 
takes root in differences in the behavior of TFP. 
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1980 and 1986 (Pavcnik (2002) and others), and have incorrectly assumed that 
the economy was far more flexible in the mid 1980s than in the early 1980s. 
This is not the case as, for instance, the mean tariff reached 35% by mid 1985, 
whereas in 1980 it was only 10%.
Our results suggest a quantitatively relevant connection between market 
reforms and efficiency gains in Chile. By decomposing productivity dynamics 
into production reallocation and within plant efficiency changes, we find that 
once reforms were fully implemented, aggregate efficiency gains were explained 
in equal proportions by within plant changes and the net entry of more produc-
tive economic units. The reallocation among incumbent firms did not contribute 
significantly to changes in efficiency, however.
We also analyze the behavior of within-plant efficiency gains. We find that 
although newly created firms display lower productivity than incumbents at 
the beginning, entering survivors quickly improve their productivity. After one 
period only, the productivity of a new plant is statistically equal to that of an 
incumbent. Meanwhile, exiting plants experience a downward trajectory of 
productivity prior to exit. Thus, inefficient plants are replaced by firms that are 
more efficient and that experience rapid improvements in productivity. That is, 
plant turnover leads to aggregate efficiency gains.
How does idiosyncratic efficiency respond to specific market reforms? We 
examine the effects of trade liberalization and financial market reforms on plant 
dynamics. To study the role of trade, we classify plants according to the trade 
orientation of the sector they belong to. We show that firms producing trad-
able goods are many times more productive than firms producing non-tradable 
goods. This productivity advantage increased over time, indicating not only 
the existence of a lag between reforms and their effect on TFP, but also that the 
bilateral agreements that were signed after 1990 are associated with additional 
productivity gains. We also analyze the reaction of plant-level TFP to changes 
in the effective tariff rate. We show that plants producing in exporting, import-
competing and other tradable sectors grow faster when effective tariffs fall. 
Overall our results are consistent with the hypothesis that specialization and 
trade, both in input and final product markets, generate efficiency gains. These 
gains could potentially be attributed to a variety of reasons, such as a reduction 
in production costs if some inputs are imported, and to the incentives to trim 
domestic firms’ fat as foreign competition increases.
After the early 1980s crisis, and after the implementation of tax and social 
security reforms that strongly promoted savings, Chile experienced an invest-
ment boom, with financial market deepening and foreign finance expansion. 
To explore the role of the development of financial markets on plant efficiency 
we use the identification strategy of Rajan and Zingales (1998), and find that 
financial market deepening relatively favored productivity gains within plants 
producing in sectors that are more dependent on external financing. These re-
sults are consistent with the hypothesis that firms that were credit constrained 
experienced the largest gains from financial market development.
In short, the exposure to foreign markets and the higher access to external 
finance have fostered aggregate efficiency gains in Chile. These are the result 
of the adoption of better technologies and production processes, both by new 
firms and incumbents.
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The policy implication derived from this paper is clear: Exposing firms to 
the best practices is necessary to generate conditions that promote aggregate 
growth. On the opposite side, rigidities that block plant dynamics, particularly 
through altering the natural process of birth and death of plants, impede growth 
and limit development.
A number of papers have also analyzed the link between growth, TFP and 
policies in Chile2. Using aggregate data and numerical simulations, Bergoeing 
et al. (2002b) suggest that banking and bankruptcy law reforms explain Chile’s 
steep recovery path after the severe crises of the early 1980s through their effect 
on TFP. Caballero et al. (2004) measure labor market inflexibilities by the speed 
at which plants close the gap between labor productivity and the marginal cost 
of hiring workers. Although Chile exhibits a relatively high degree of micro 
flexibility, the paper suggests that its decline is large enough to explain the 
decline in TFP-growth observed since 1997.
Perhaps because of the early timing of the trade liberalization and because 
the post-crisis recovery was driven by export growth, most papers using micro 
level data have studied the relationship between Chile’s trade reforms and 
TFP. Liu (1991) analyzes whether the competitive pressure from trade reforms 
forced less efficient plants to fail more frequently. Tybout (1992) deals with the 
heterogeneous effects on technical efficiency of exposure to increased foreign 
competition. Alvarez and Fuentes (2003) examine the changes in the composition 
of manufacturing production and the implied productivity changes as a response 
to the liberalization. Bas and Ledezma (2007) estimate trade barriers in a multi-
lateral context to disentangle the effect of export –and import– oriented policies 
on plant productivity. Although these papers use different statistical strategies, 
they all suggest that trade liberalization played a relevant role in explaining 
TFP. On a related matter, Fernandes and Paunov (2008) study the role of FDI 
on plant productivity growth suggesting that reductions in barriers restricting 
foreign investment may help accelerate growth. Similarly, Alvarez and Crespi 
(2009) show that multinationals may play a role in speeding up across-plant 
convergence in TFP3.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the main struc-
tural reforms implemented in Chile since the mid 1970s and its macroeconomic 
performance afterwards. In Section 3 we present the manufacturing data used 
and we characterize aggregate and plant-level TFP. In Section 4 we study and 
quantify the role of market oriented policies in the process of efficiency enhanc-
ing plant-dynamics. The final section concludes.
2. Market reforms in chile: an overview
Today few question the significance of the structural reforms initiated thirty 
years ago in shaping the economic transformation of Chile over the past few 
2 Alvarez and Fuentes (2003) describe the early literature.
3 A related literature that we do not review here studies different aspects of the relative 
performance of exporters and non-exporters. See, for instance, Alvarez (2007) and 
Alvarez and López (2005 and 2008).
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decades4. The scenario was very different in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
however. Trade restrictions had practically isolated the Chilean economy from 
the rest of the world. The structure of relative prices was drastically distorted in 
favor of industrial goods at the expense of agricultural, mining and other tradable 
activities. Differential import duties exempted capital goods and levied high 
taxes on final goods, creating a largely inefficient capital –intensive industrial 
sector. In particular, import tariffs ranged from 0 percent for capital goods to 
750 percent for luxury goods. There was also a requirement of a 90-day non-
interest bearing deposit of 10,000 percent of the CIF value of imported goods 
and all import operations required administrative approval. In addition, a system 
of multiple exchange rates prevailed reaching at the collapse of the economy 
in 1973 a 52 to 1 ratio.
The few imports that resulted were concentrated on intermediate goods, 
followed by capital goods and some essential consumer goods. Exports were 
mostly concentrated on copper, making the trade balance highly dependent on 
the evolution of copper prices. Moreover, several foreign mining companies, 
banks and enterprises had been nationalized.
In short, the military government that took power in September 1973 
inherited an economy closed to international trade, dominated by the public 
sector, and with severe macroeconomic imbalances in the form of accelerating 
inflation and a deteriorating balance of payments. Relative prices were starkly 
distorted and the production and distribution of goods was mainly determined 
by bureaucratic rules. The labor market was dominated by a few unions, which 
were fighting for political rather than for workers’ objectives. The country had 
practically no foreign exchange reserves and the fiscal budget reached a deficit 
of 25% of GDP.
Since the very beginning, the military government implemented far-ranging 
pro-market reforms. The initial set of trade reforms was intended to simplify the 
structure of the economy. Consistently, exchange markets were unified and all 
restrictions to trade other than tariffs were removed immediately, while tariffs 
were reduced from an average of 94% in 1973 to a uniform rate of 10% by 1979. 
Price ceilings and public purchasing mechanisms were also eliminated, and 
the state withdrew from most areas of the economy, including labor relations, 
international economic relations and social services.
In short, the initial reforms contemplated nine main themes: (1) A stabiliza-
tion program to reduce an increasing inflation; (2) the liberalization of markets 
in an effort to get the price system back in operation; (3) public sector reforms 
to reach macroeconomic stability and to improve its efficiency and that of the 
whole economy; (4) trade reforms to provide incentives to export oriented and 
import competing activities; (5) a social security reform to transit from a pay-as-
you go pension system to one based on individual capitalization; (6) a financial 
sector reform to improve the efficiency of financial intermediation; (7) a labor 
market reform to facilitate the industrial restructuring and the drastic realloca-
tion of labor that had to take place from the highly protected import competing 
4 The Chilean economic transformation has been extensively documented by Cox-
Edwards and Edwards (1991), De la Cuadra and Hachette (1991), Corbo (1993), 
and Bosworth et al. (1994). 
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sectors towards the export oriented activities; (8) a comprehensive privatization 
program; and (9) social sector reforms to improve incentives in the production 
and provision of social services.
Early on, the economy recovered at high speed: During the 1976-80 period, 
GDP grew at an average rate of 7% and the availability of foreign goods expanded 
markedly. However, and although reforms continued its advance in several 
fronts, two major problems remained unsolved: The unemployment rate did not 
decline in a significant manner and inflation remained stubbornly high. Among 
the instruments used to control inflation, the fixing of the nominal exchange rate 
in June 1979 proved to have a devastating effect. The highly indexed nature of 
the Chilean economy, in combination with the fixed exchange rate, induced an 
increasing real exchange rate overvaluation, fostering imports and discouraging 
exports and leading to large current account deficits. In 1981, the external deficit 
reached 14.5% of GDP. Large amounts of foreign loans entered the country to 
finance the trade imbalance and, as a consequence, foreign debt skyrocketed 
between 1977 and 1981. Two additional elements also helped generate the 
observed rise in the level of indebtedness: The resistance of the real interest 
rate to converge to world levels and the deregulation of the financial market in 
1981. The former induced a continuous flow of short-term lending; the lack of 
adequate supervision of the quality of the portfolio of banks due to the latter, led 
to a generalized miscalculation of risk levels and imprudent domestic lending 
(Barandiarán and Hernández, 1999).
With such a large trade imbalance, confidence on the Chilean economy 
faltered and foreign lending ceased. In June 1982 the authorities were forced 
to devalue the peso by 19%, but “it was too little and too late” (Cox-Edwards 
and Edwards, 1991). The economy fell in a deep recession as GDP dropped 
by 13.6% in 1982 and a further 2.8% in 1983. Unemployment, at already high 
levels, swelled to 34% of the labor force (including emergency employment 
programs), and the government deficit increased to almost 9% of GDP when 
the Central Bank had to rescue the financial sector from bankruptcy. Foreign 
debt reached 130% of GDP in 1983.
This recession led authorities to partially reverse the openness policies. In 
particular, the mean tariff was raised, reaching a level of 35% in 1985. Since 
then, however, the reduction in tariffs continued.
Starting in 1985, the government went through a second round of privatiza-
tions that included public utility firms and financial companies that had been 
taken over in the 1982 financial collapse. In 1986 a new banking law was imple-
mented. As a result, the financial system was rebuilt and a greater supervisory 
role for the Central Bank was established. Innovative debt conversion schemes 
were introduced to reduce foreign debt by approximately 50%.
In 1990, and after 17 years of a military regime, democratic elections were 
held and the candidate of a center-left coalition was elected. Immediately after 
the new president was in power, the commercial links with the rest of the world 
were strengthened and a number of multilateral agreements were initiated. As 
of today, Chile maintains trade agreements with most economies in the world, 
covering more than 95% of its exports. Similarly, capital inflows increased as 
foreign investment decisions were determined by market conditions. The 1990s 
mark the consolidation of a market economy drastically transformed during the 
previous 15 years.
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Since the beginning, the democratic governments maintained a strong fiscal 
stance and the Central Bank of Chile –independent since 1989– gradually re-
duced inflation to its lowest level in half a century. Public spending on social 
programs increased sharply. Structural reforms proceeded at a much slower 
pace, however.
Summing up, only during the late 1980s and early 1990s the Chilean economy 
fully reaped the benefits from the changes in economic incentives and produc-
tive structure that came with market reforms. By the end of the 1990s, Chile 
had unquestionably been the Latin American country with the most consistent 
record over the past two decades. The sound and stable behavior of most mac-
roeconomic indicators and the sharp improvement in social indices place Chile 
as the most successful recent experience in the region. In fact, the 1990s were 
much more stable than the 1980s in spite of the Tequila and the Asian crises. 
The volatility of detrended GDP was 5.8% during the 1970s, 5% during the 
1980s, and only 2.1% during the 1990s.
3. Plant dynamics and aggregate tPf
Two sources of productivity gains drive aggregate efficiency over time: 
The exposure of economic units to better production methods (within-plant 
efficiency gains) and the Schumpeterian creative destruction process through 
which efficient firms thrive while inefficient ones disappear (reallocation driven 
efficiency gains). The former results from the adoption of better technologies 
and more efficient production processes by incumbents; the latter occurs from 
the reshuffling of resources from less to more productive firms, and from the 
entry process of new and more efficient firms that replace old and less effi-
cient ones. A number of papers report evidence for developed and developing 
economies on the importance of plant dynamics in accounting for aggregate 
efficiency gains5.
This virtuous process of reallocation, technology adoption and efficiency 
gains should be directly linked to market reforms. Two recently available regu-
larities support this prior: First, the research based on plant-level data shows 
that productivity is highly heterogeneous across units, even within narrowly 
defined sectors at any given period of time. This heterogeneity is a necessary 
condition for the reallocation of inputs and output to be a relevant source of 
productivity gains and aggregate growth. Second, the data show that vintage is 
an important factor in explaining productivity gaps. Hence, the entry of firms 
with new technologies and production processes is also an important source 
of TFP gains. Therefore, market reforms that promote this entry-exit process 
and facilitate a better allocation of resources spur TFP growth by inducing the 
adoption of superior production techniques and by reshuffling resources towards 
their most efficient use.
In the remainder of this section, we look into the microeconomic components 
of the aggregate dynamics of TFP. We first disentangle the sources of aggregate 
TFP gains into within-plant productivity, reallocation and net entry effects. 
5 See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for a review of the literature.
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We then provide a more detailed view of the relative productivity evolution of 
entering and exiting plants in order to better understand the role of net entry 
effects on aggregate TFP growth. In the following section we provide evidence 
that suggests that, at least for Chile, market reforms are linked to the underlying 
microeconomic sources of the economy wide TFP gains.
(a) characterizing aggregate productivity from plant-level data
The data in this study come from the 1980-2001 Encuesta Nacional Industrial 
Anual (ENIA), an annual survey of manufacturing conducted by the Chilean 
statistics agency, the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE). The ENIA covers 
all manufacturing plants that employ at least ten individuals. Thus, it includes 
all newly created and continuing plants with ten or more employees, and it 
excludes plants that ceased activities or reduced their hiring below the survey’s 
threshold6. The ENIA collects detailed information on plant characteristics 
such as manufacturing sub-sector at the 4-digit ISIC level, sales, employment, 
investment, intermediate inputs and location.
Using this data set, Bergoeing et al. (2006) have estimated production func-
tions and plant-level TFP using the strategy developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) 
and further extended by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). They provide estimates of 
the production functions for 26 3-digit ISIC sub-sectors that account for 92% of 
total real gross revenue in the ENIA. The measure of plant-level TFP we use in 
this paper is the residual from those estimated production functions.
Figure 1 plots the evolution of the simple average of plant-level log TFP and 
some measures of its dispersion. Average TFP displays large changes across 
the first and second half of our sample. Specifically, in 1987, aggregate TFP 
was about 9% lower than in 1980. It then grew steadily until year 2000. TFP 
dispersion, measured using the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles 
follows a similar pattern. When measured using the coefficient of variation, the 
dynamic pattern is somewhat different. However in any case, the figure shows that 
there is wide dispersion in TFP across plants –the coefficient of variation moves 
between 0.34 and 0.45 throughout the period whereas the minimum interdecile 
range equals 2.0–, so most of the variation is associated with dispersion of TFP 
at the plant level in any given year. Calculations for sectors at the three-digit 
level show a consistent pattern. These large differences in productivity are a 
necessary condition for reallocation to be a relevant source of efficiency gains. 
Additionally, the figure shows a substantial increase in the dispersion of TFP 
in spite of the reduction in aggregate volatility in the late 1980s relative to the 
6 The treatment of entry and exit is somewhat complicated by the fact that plants fall-
ing below the minimum employment boundary do not appear in the survey. Thus a 
plant interviewed in any given year, but that fails to enter the sample in the following 
year might not represent an exit. Similarly, a plant appearing for the first time in any 
given year does not necessarily correspond to an entry, as it might represent a grow-
ing plant that surpasses the ten people boundary. To reduce the extent of spurious 
identification of plant entry and exit, we artificially raised the sample threshold to 
15 employees, following the strategy in Micco (1995).
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FIGURE 1
MEAN TPF AND ITS DISPERSION
earlier years of our sample period7. In 1980, the coefficient of variation was equal 
to 0.43. By 2001, it peaked at a level of 0.46 after reaching its lowest point at 
0.34 in 1996. This higher relative heterogeneity may reflect the higher degree 
of market flexibility due to the reforms implemented a decade earlier.
Figure 2 plots the evolution of the simple and weighted average log TFP, using 
the shares of each plant’s value-added out of total value-added in a given year 
as weights. This weighted measure has been extensively used in the literature in 
order to capture the aggregate productivity gains due to the allocation of activity 
(Foster et al., 1998). Olley and Pakes (1996) decompose this weighted average 
into the simple average and a covariance term between market shares and TFP. 
Whenever the most efficient firms have the largest market shares, the alloca-
tion of inputs and output is efficiency enhancing. If so, the weighted average 
reaches a higher level than the simple average.8 The figure shows that in Chile 
the weighted measure is always above the simple average, thus that production 
is disproportionately located at the most efficient plants.
7 Comin and Mulani (2006) show that aggregate and firm level volatilities have also 
followed diverging paths over the past two decades in Canada and in the United 
States. In particular, while the former has decreased, the latter has increased.
8 The covariance term is the distance between the weighted and simple averages 
measures depicted in Figure 2.
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Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that aggregate TFP is mostly accounted 
for by the simple average, and not by the allocation term9. The relative con-
tribution of the covariance term varies over the period and is larger over the 
1980s when it reached an average relative importance of 9%. Starting in 1988, 
average productivity drives the increase in productivity observed in the Chilean 
manufacturing sector. After a large number of distortionary policies that placed 
impediments on reallocation were removed, the allocation of resources among 
incumbents lost relative importance. The adoption of better techniques seems 
to largely account for the improved industry performance.
(b) the sources of aggregate tfP gains
We now disentangle aggregate productivity dynamics into within-plant 
efficiency changes and the reallocation gains arising from the expansion and 
contraction of continuing plants as well as from the entry and exit of economic 
units. We follow Foster et al. (1998) in decomposing productivity growth into 
four elements: (i) A within-plant effect, given by incumbents’ productivity 
growth weighted by initial output shares; (ii) a reallocation effect, that captures 
9 Foster et al. (1998) find similar results for the US. In contrast, Eslava et al. (2004) 
find that the contribution of the covariance term accounts for almost all aggregate 
productivity in Colombia. 
FIGURE 2
TPF EVOLUTION: SIMPLE AND WEIGHTED MEANS
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the gains in aggregate productivity coming from the expanding market share 
of high productivity plants relative to the initial aggregate productivity level; 
(iii) an entry effect which is the sum of the differences between each entering 
plant’s productivity and initial aggregate productivity, weighted by its market 
share; and (iv) an exit effect given by the sum of the differences between each 
exiting plant’s productivity and initial aggregate productivity, weighted by its 
market share. The decomposition is given by:
  
∆ ∆ ∆P = P P = p + (p Pt t t k it k
i C
it
i C
it it t k− −− −
∈ ∈
−∑ ∑θ θ ) +
(p P ) (p P )it
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it t k it k
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it k t kθ θ
∈
− −
∈
− −∑ ∑− − −
where Δ refers to changes over the k-year interval; Pt is the log aggregate pro-
ductivity level in year t; pit is plant’s i log efficiency in year t; θit is its output 
share in total output at time t, and C, N, and X are the sets of continuing, ente-
ring, and exiting plants, respectively. Thus, incumbents contribute to aggregate 
log productivity growth whenever they become more efficient, and whenever 
the more productive plants increase their market share. New plants contribute 
positively to productivity growth if they have higher productivity than the initial 
industry average. Exiting plants contribute if they have lower productivity than 
the initial industry average. The last three terms of the decomposition capture 
the effects of heterogeneity. If all plants were identical, then the within effect 
would constitute the only source of aggregate gains.
The results of this decomposition are presented in Panel A of Table 1. The 
first column of Table 1 displays our results for the full sample period. Aggregate 
productivity gains are driven completely by the entry of new, more productive 
firms. The contribution of within-incumbents efficiency gains and of the real-
location of value added among continuing plants is small when such a long 
period of time is considered.
In columns (2) to (5) we decompose aggregate TFP growth in four different 
five year periods. Over these shorter periods within plant productivity gains are 
more important than over longer periods. This fact, combined with the results in 
the first column, imply that entrant firms experience faster productivity growth 
than incumbents10. In column (7) we present the decomposition when consider-
ing the 1986-1998 period that most analysts consider as the “economic miracle” 
period in the recent Chilean economic history. This appreciation seems to be 
confirmed by the numbers: productivity gains by entering plants and realloca-
tion of production within incumbents both explain more of the productivity gain 
in the manufacturing sector than productivity associated to exiting firms does. 
Finally, column (8) repeats the exercise focusing on the aggregate productivity 
10 Recall that, due to our partition of the time dimension, a plant that is an entrant in 
column (2) is either an incumbent or an exiting plant in column(3). Thus faster in-
cumbents productivity gains in a 5 year period than in the overall sample means that 
previous entrants (younger incumbents) experience faster productivity growth.
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growth between 1988 and 200111. As already shown in Figure 2, the time-series 
pattern of aggregate TFP suggests a break in the evolution around 1988. The 
gains in aggregate efficiency in the later period are twice as large as the gains 
obtained over the complete sample period. Moreover, like in the full period, the 
net entry of new firms accounts for a large fraction of aggregate gains. However, 
this time within-plant efficiency improvements also contribute significantly to 
aggregate TFP growth.
One possible concern with the previous exercise is that, over long periods, 
the results may be driven by natural plant dynamics (that is, the vegetative 
rates of plants been born, growing and dying). In other words, the relative 
relevance of the net entry effect might not be surprising, given the length of 
the time period considered12. Still, Panel B of Table 1 shows that, for any of 
the periods considered, incumbent plants represent a large share of both total 
plants and total value added. Thus, it is not the case that productivity gains in 
incumbents are not important because they are a small share of the sample but 
because those gains in productivity are of much smaller magnitude than those 
taking place in entering firms or resulting from less productive firms exiting 
the manufacturing sector.
Overall, the results suggest that when reforms were fully implemented, 
the average plant exhibited important efficiency improvements. Reallocation 
played a key role due to the net entry of firms that had higher than average 
productivity more than to changes in the allocation of inputs and output across 
incumbent plants.
(c) the behavior of plant entry and exit
The aggregate TFP growth accounting grants a key role to the net entry of 
plants in long periods of time. In this section we further analyze the relative 
efficiency of newly created plants and shutdowns.
There exists a vast theoretical literature on firm heterogeneity pioneered by 
Jovanovic (1982) and further extended by Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes 
(1995), Bergoeing et al. (2004), and Bergoeing et al. (2010). These models are 
characterized by heterogeneous production units, vintage capital, common and 
idiosyncratic shocks, and an ongoing process of plant entry and exit. Plants exit 
if aggregate economic prospects loom negative. Plants may also exit if their 
current technology becomes obsolete. Thus plants with relatively low level of 
technology are scrapped. New units enter embodying inputs and production 
processes that reflect the leading edge technology. However, new firms are 
11 Our estimates correct for the fact that plants may leave and re-enter the sample without 
having actually exited the market. For instance, a plant may leave the sample prior 
to 1988 and reenter in 1989 or later. This plant is an incumbent according to our 
definition of entry and exit, but would be incorrectly classified as an entry if only 
data for years 1988 and 2001 were to be considered. There are 93 plants in our data 
set that leave and reenter the sample around 1988. It is worth emphasizing, though, 
that the results in Table 1 are almost unchanged if these corrections are not made. 
12 After a 20 year time span, only 35% of plants are expected to survive if the uncon-
ditional probability of exit in any time period is 5%. See Bergoeing et al. (2006).
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uncertain with respect to their own idiosyncratic efficiency, and thus may enter 
and quickly leave the market after this uncertainty is resolved.
Table 2 reports regressions of plant-level log TFP accounting for entry and 
exit effects. The entry dummy is equal to one in period t if the plant produced 
in year t but not in any previous period. Similarly, the exit dummy is equal to 
one in period t if the plant produced in that year, but not in any period ahead. 
The first column shows that the typical entering plant is less productive than 
incumbents, contrary to the predictions of vintage capital models13. Still, newly 
created firms have an advantage over shutdowns. Depending upon the specifi-
cation, incumbents have a 3.2% to 3.9% productivity advantage over entering 
plants. This difference rises to about 7% when continuing plants are compared 
to exiting plants.
TABLE 2
PLANT LEVEL TFP, EFFECTS OF ENTRY AND EXIT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entry –0.039 –0.032 –0.043 –0.037
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
One period lag of Entry –0.011 –0.008
(0.008) (0.008)
Two periods lag of Entry –0.007 –0.008
(0.009) (0.009)
Exit –0.070 –0.073 –0.073 –0.076
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
One period lead of Exit –0.051 –0.053
(0.008) (0.008)
Two periods lead of Exit –0.029 –0.033
 (0.008) (0.008)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector*Year dummies No Yes No Yes
N 84907 84907 84036 84036
R2 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.90
The third and fourth columns of the table explore the dynamics of productivity 
post entry and prior to exit. Does the productivity of firms that enter increase 
over time? Are there learning effects? Similarly, does the efficiency of exiting 
plants deteriorate before they actually exit? To explore the evolution of exiting 
firms’ productivity we added one and two period leads of the exit dummy to our 
specification. Similarly, to account for learning effects we added one and two 
period lags of the entry dummy. The results reported on columns (3) and (4) 
suggest that exiting plants experience a downward trajectory of productivity prior 
to exit. Several studies have reported similar results for other countries14. The 
13 Bartelsman and Doms (2000) report similar evidence for the OECD.
14 See Tybout (2000) for a review.
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results also suggest that entering survivors quickly improve their productivity. 
After one period only, the productivity of a new plant is statistically equal to 
that of an incumbent. These patterns imply that inefficient plants are replaced 
by firms that are more efficient, and that experience rapid improvements in 
productivity. Plant turnover thus leads to aggregate efficiency gains.
4. Market reforms and productivity gains:
 the chilean evidence
In this section we analyze the effects of two key reforms on the dynamics of 
plant-level TFP: Trade liberalization and financial market deepening. The evi-
dence we present is suggestive of the consequences these reforms may have had 
on plant performance. This evidence, though, should not be taken as conclusive, 
due to two limitations of our analysis. First of all, a large number of reforms 
were implemented at the same time. Secondly, the reforms implemented in Chile 
were neutral in the sense that they gave the same incentives to all firms (e.g., 
one single tariff rate taxes the imports of all goods). Thus it is hard to identify 
the effects of any single reform on the economy.
With these caveats in mind, in this section we present evidence that suggests 
that the exposure to foreign markets and a higher access to external finance have 
fostered efficiency gains in Chile. These TFP increases have resulted mostly 
from the adoption of better technologies and production processes, both by new 
firms and incumbents.
(a) the effects of trade reforms on plant-level efficiency
Trade liberalization enhances plant and aggregate productivity through dif-
ferent channels. First of all, it exposes domestic firms to foreign competition, 
reducing their market power and forcing them to improve their efficiency in 
order to ensure survival. Secondly, if there are domestic and foreign market 
entry costs, trade liberalization induces the least efficient plants to shutdown, 
whereas only the most productive plants are able to successfully export15. Trade 
also facilitates the access to foreign technology and reduces the cost of foreign 
intermediate and capital goods.
To explore the effects of trade policy on plant-level productivity, we clas-
sify plants according to the trade orientation of the sector they belong to at the 
3-digit ISIC level16. Compared to firms in non-traded goods sectors, firms in 
export-oriented and import-competing sectors are exposed to the competition 
15 See Eaton and Kortum (2002), Melitz (2003), and Bernard et al. (2003) for recent 
models of trade with heterogeneous firms. 
16 We have chosen to classify plants’ trade orientation based on sector level observa-
tions rather than on plant level export-import status to avoid classifying firms on the 
basis of a variable that is endogenous to productivity at the plant level. See Melitz 
(2003).
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of foreign firms, and thus must be more efficient in order to survive. All plants, 
though, are benefited by the reduced cost of foreign inputs.
We use the sector classification of Hernando (2001). According to this strategy, 
sectors can be classified depending upon the export intensity of sales and the 
volume of imported competing goods. A sector is non-traded if (1) the export 
share in total sales is lower than 10% and import penetration does not exceed 
6%, or (2) import penetration is lower than 10% and the export share does not 
exceed 6%. A sector is export-oriented if the export intensity of sales is larger 
than 10%. A sector is import competing if import penetration exceeds 20%. 
Using data for 1986-1996, Hernando (2001) finds that export oriented sectors are 
those related to natural resources, such as the manufacturing of paper, chemicals, 
food processing, and beverages. The sectors classified as import-competing 
are those that are labor intensive, such as textiles and leather industries. The 
manufacture of machinery is also classified as import competing. Under this 
classification, some sectors are both import-competing and export-oriented, so 
we created another category called “other traded”. Thus using this classification, 
we generated a set of dummy variables indicating the trade orientation status 
of each plant’s sector.
Ideally, to estimate the effects of trade liberalization on plants, one would 
use a measure of trade protection that varies across firms. However, Chile had 
reduced its tariffs to 10% for all goods in 1979 –prior to the start of our sample 
period–, and then changed the level of protection in a uniform manner. Thus, in 
the Chilean case it is not possible to clearly identify the effects of trade reforms, 
and to disentangle them from the effects of other reforms enacted at the same 
time. Other countries, such as Brazil –studied by Schor (2004)– maintained 
differential tariffs that depended upon sectors and upon the stage of production 
of goods (final or intermediate).
We have taken two approaches to deal with the identification issues discussed 
above. First, we estimate the differential evolution of plant-level TFP over our 
sample period for firms producing in export-oriented, import-competing and 
other tradable sectors. This is a rather flexible parameterization of the effects 
of trade on plant efficiency. However, it does not take into account the swings 
that trade protection has experienced in Chile since the mid-1970s. Although 
Chile today ranks highly in an index of free trade policies, tariffs and other key 
variables did not evolve smoothly towards their current levels17. In our second 
exercise we take into account the dynamics of effective tariff rates as a deter-
minant of the evolution of plant-level TFP.
To follow the evolution of plant TFP producing in traded relative to non 
traded sectors, we ran fixed effects regressions of plant efficiency. These re-
gressions include time and sector effects, and dummies indicating the trade 
status of the industry. The regressions also include the interaction of the trade 
indicator variables with the time dummies. The estimated results show that firms 
producing tradable goods are many times more productive than plants produc-
17 See  the  Index  of  Economic  Freedom  developed  by  the  Heritage  Foundation 
(http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/).
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ing non-traded goods18. Interestingly, the productivity advantage of tradables 
increased further over the sample period as depicted in Figure 3, which shows 
the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms (the base case being non-
tradable producing plants). After a steep rise over the early 1980s, by 1986 the 
productivity advantage of traded sectors experienced a downturn. Although the 
estimated dynamics is not strictly monotonic, plant-level TFP in traded sectors 
experienced an upward trend in the 1990s relative to non traded sectors. The 
evolution of TFP in export-oriented, import-competing and other traded sectors 
was qualitatively the same over the sample period.
These findings suggest that plants did respond to an intensified foreign com-
petition. Possibly these within-plant productivity gains are a result of a reduced 
cost of foreign capital and intermediate materials, self-selection into international 
markets, and learning from international buyers, sellers and competitors. A better 
functioning of financial markets might as well have helped to improve relative 
productivity if credit flows relatively favored traded sectors.
18 Similarly, Bergoeing et al. (2010) show that firms that export have a large productiv-
ity advantage over non-exporting firms. 
FIGURE 3
PRODUCTIVITY EVOLUTION IN TRADED SECTORS
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The results in Figure 3 do not take into account the fact that although trade 
was initially liberalized in 1976, the deep recession of 1982-83 led the authorities 
to reverse some of these free trade policies. Figure 4 depicts the effective tariff 
rate faced by domestic producers over the years 1980 to 2001. Between 1980 
and 1982 the effective tariff reached an average of 5.47%. Between 1983 and 
1986, this average almost doubled, reaching a level of 10.62%. Only in 1999 
the effective tariff recovered the level of 1980. By 2001 and after a number of 
bilateral trade agreements were signed and fully functioning, the rate had fallen 
to 3.69%.
These ups and downs in trade policy might explain the swings in the estimated 
evolution of the relative productivity of traded sectors shown in Figure 3. To 
explore this hypothesis we ran regressions directly controlling for the evolution 
of the effective tariff19. That is, we estimated the following model for the natural 
log of productivity of plant i in sector j, and year t,
  p = + + + + +ijt i j t ijt j jϕ δ µ ψ β γ⋅ ⋅size traded traded effective_tariffi ijt+ε
where sizeijt is the logarithm of the total employment of plant i in sector j and 
year t20, tradedj is a dummy or a vector of dummies indicating the trade status 
of sector j, and effective_tarifft is the level reached by the effective tariff in 
19 Anderson and Neary (2005) discuss the drawbacks of the use of effective tariffs 
and other standard measures of trade protection whenever there are multiple trade 
barriers. 
20 There’s some evidence in Alvarez (2007) that productivity is positively related to 
firm size, measured by its employment. We add the log of the employment to control 
for this effect.
FIGURE 4
EFFECTIVE TARIFF IN CHILE
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year t21. We use data for two subsamples: the one starting in 1983 (to avoid the 
particularly abnormal period of 1981-82) and the one starting in 1990 (the logic 
for this analysis will become evident later on).
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 3 display our estimation results. The first column 
shows that a one percentage point rise in the effective tariff rate reduces produc-
tivity in traded sectors by two percentage points. The sign of this effect indicates 
that on average, traded sectors benefit from trade exposition. The estimated effect 
is precisely estimated and statistically significant. The second column of Table 3 
allows for a differential impact of tariffs on export-oriented, import-competing 
and other traded sectors. The results reveal that these sectors respond in similar 
ways to trade protection: the productivity of export-oriented, import-competing, 
and other traded sectors all are significantly reduced as tariffs rise.
These results suggest that effective tariffs reduce the efficiency of plants 
that produce in import-competing sectors. This result is hardly surprising as the 
protection granted by tariffs reduces the toughness of competition.
Other traded sectors are hurt when effective tariffs rise, possibly because 
foreign intermediate and capital goods become more costly, and because the 
reduction in external competition allows the less productive plants to survive. 
Export oriented sectors are also sensitive to tariffs. Yet, it is likely that our ef-
fective tariff measure is a poor proxy of the trade policy faced by exporters, as 
they respond to the tariffs imposed by other countries, and not to those relevant 
for local imports. Given that trade policy was undertaken unilaterally over most 
of the sample period, internal and external tariffs are most likely uncorrelated. 
Still, the estimates may reflect a similar effect to those related to other tradable 
products: better access to foreign intermediate and capital goods.
Overall our results show that on average all traded sectors have become 
more productive, relative to non-traded sectors over our sample period. The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that specialization and trade, both in 
input and final product markets, generate efficiency gains. Our results also show 
that the response of plant TFP to domestic trade protection is very similar for 
plants producing in tradable sectors. They suggest that lowering effective tariffs 
increases the efficiency of plants in all tradable producing plants regardless of 
whether they are in import-competing, or export-oriented sectors. These gains 
could potentially be attributed to a variety of reasons. The first may be that the 
cost of production is reduced whenever tariffs fall and some inputs are imported. 
Another possible explanation is that reduced protection induces domestic firms 
to trim their fat as foreign competition increases.
21 A potential concern with our results is that we are ignoring any dynamic effects. 
Since productivity tends to be very persistent, one may feel that a dynamic specifi-
cation should be more appropriate to control for this autocorrelation. However, our 
estimation procedure for TFP models productivity as following a random walk with 
Markovian iid innovations. Thus the persistence related to production and investment 
decisions is already controlled for by the procedure. Therefore, there should be no 
need to explicitly control for persistence or trends beyond the period fixed effects. 
Still, as a check, we estimated the model using a dynamic panel specification with 
four lags of the dependent variable and the Arellano-Bond method to correct for the 
bias present in dynamic panels. The results, presented in the Appendix, are quali-
tatively the same.
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(b) the role of financial markets development
Poorly functioning financial markets limit the creation of new firms as 
they lack the necessary funds for project finance. Similarly, credit constrained 
incumbents face limits to their ability to adopt new technology, to retool and 
to grow. Starting in the mid 1980s, Chile experienced an investment boom 
associated to the deepening of financial markets, the entry of foreign finance, 
the privatization of the public pension system and a tax reform that promoted 
firms’ saving22.
In this section we examine whether financial development facilitated within-
plant productivity growth. In assessing the effects of a better access to financial 
markets on micro efficiency, we follow the literature on imperfect capital markets, 
based upon the hypothesis that asymmetric information and incentive problems 
in financial markets imply that agency costs and the internal resources of a 
firm influence the cost of external funds. Capital market deepening reduces the 
extent of these agency problems, and thus the cost of funds. Therefore, when 
credit constraints are relaxed, the funds available for all firms increase, favor-
ing relatively more those that lack the necessary funds to finance its activities. 
Thus, plants that are credit constrained are those that are more likely to gain 
when financial markets deepen.
As discussed above, the identification of financial constraints in micro level 
panel data is a difficult task. Particularly, many of the measures used in the 
literature are endogenous. To circumvent these problems, Rajan and Zingales 
(1998, henceforth RZ) proposed a measure of external financial dependence 
that is exogenous to any individual firm’s growth prospects. Specifically, RZ 
identify an industry’s need for external finance from data on U.S. firms. As the 
U.S. financial markets are relatively frictionless, an industry’s external finance 
dependence in the American economy is a good proxy for the technological 
demand for external financing in other economies. RZ use this information to 
study whether industries that are more dependent on external financing grow 
relatively faster in countries that are more financially developed. A number of 
recent papers have used this identification strategy to perform tests of the effects 
of cross-country differences in financial development23.
We adapt RZ’s strategy to the comparison of plant-level TFP over time 
within a country. That is, we study the differential impact of Chile’s financial 
development over the 1983-2001 period on sectors with different external finance 
requirements24. We estimate the following model
  p = + + + + ext findev +ijt i j t ijt t j t ijtϕ δ µ ψ γ ε⋅ ∗size
22 See Coronado (2002) for an analysis of the effects of the privatization of Social 
Security on savings, and Hsieh and Parker (2008) for an analysis of the role of the 
tax reforms on the Chilean investment using the ENIA. 
23 For instance, see Galindo et al. (2002), Fisman and Love (2004), Braun and Larraín 
(2005), and Hsieh and Parker (2006) for different applications of this identification 
strategy.
24 Again, we restrict the period of analysis to that starting in 1983 to avoid including 
the 1982 crisis, an abnormal period.
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where pijt represents the natural log of plant’s i TFP, producing in sector j at 
time t. The regression includes plant, sector and year dummies. The variable 
extj is RZ’s measure of the external financing dependence of sector j, whereas 
the variable findevt is a measure of Chile’s financial development in year t. In 
this paper, we use two alternative measures of financial development –private 
credit by deposit money banks to GDP, and private bond market capitalization 
to GDP– both taken from Beck et al. (2003)25. Figure 5 shows the evolution 
of these measures over our sample period. The figure shows that market depth 
did not rise monotonically in Chile. There is a rise in the early 1980s and a 
fall after the massive failure of banks during the 1982-83 crisis. The measures 
started to recover in the early 1990s only after a number of regulatory changes 
took place.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 present our estimation results using alternative 
specifications. In all cases, the coefficient of the interaction variable between 
external financing dependence and financial development is positive, indicating 
that the TFP of plants in industries that require more external financing grows 
faster when capital markets are deeper. We can illustrate the economic impor-
tance of the estimated coefficients by comparing the predicted differences in 
growth rates across sectors. The industry at the 75th percentile of the external 
dependence distribution is sector 321 (textiles), whereas the industry at the 25th 
percentile is sector 369 (the manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products). 
Then the estimated coefficients imply a growth rate of plant-level TFP between 
1.3 and 2.2 percentage points higher in sector 321 than in sector 369 whenever 
the market development indexes increase in 10 percentage points. Recall that 
according to Figure 5, the private bond market capitalization index grew 13.1 
percentage points between 1990 and 2001, whereas the private credit index 
grew 16.5 percentage points.
25 The latter measure is available since 1990 only.
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Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms that are credit con-
strained experienced the largest gains from financial market deepening. In an 
economy with poorly developed credit markets, actual firms and potential entrants 
with productive investment projects are unable to raise sufficient external funds 
to undertake these projects at the efficient levels. By allowing a better access to 
financial markets, these investment activities have a better likelihood of being 
implemented and to result in an improvement in plant productivity.
Finally, as a robustness check, in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 we combine 
the analysis for both policies: tariffs reduction and financial market deepening. 
The estimation results do not change significantly which implies that each policy 
is important for explaining TFP dynamics over the considered period.
5. concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined how structural reforms contribute to produc-
tivity using information at the plant level. We find that the Chilean experience 
provides suggestive evidence on the contribution of market reforms on efficiency 
gains. In particular, to two key markets –the financial market and the traded goods 
market– have helped significantly to improve plant efficiency. These efficiency 
gains may have resulted from the adoption of better technologies and production 
processes, both by incumbents and new firms. Much research remains to be done, 
though. For instance, future research should explore alternative identification 
strategies, possibly taking better advantage of the fact that not all reforms were 
undertaken at exactly the same time. Similarly, future research should broaden 
our identification approach based on the fact that the impact of market reforms 
is likely to depend on plant’s characteristics. In addition, the channels through 
which the reforms spur productivity growth should be disentangled. Moreover, 
other structural reforms could be studied. Overall, we believe that our results 
have a clear policy implication: Exposing firms to the best practices is crucial 
to promote aggregate growth.
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